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THE REPRESENTATIVE
BODY, THE SEVERED
HEAD, AND THE RUMP
Figurations of the English
State, 1640—1662
Marlin E. Blaine

juring the English CivilWars and Interregnum, Royalists and
Parliamentarians struggled not only rrdlitarily and politically
but also rhetorically to determine the relationship between
the Crown and Parliament as representatives of the political nation.'
Since the Middle Ages, the metaphor of the body politic had furnished
an image of coherence for the representative aspects of government.
This image became fragmented by the Civil Wars, however, as Parlia
ment and Crown came into political and military conflict. The shattering
of the link between the two institutions allowed synecdoche to join or
even replace metaphor as the master trope in bodily figurations of the
' For thorough treatments of the polemicalwriting of this period, see David Norbrook, Writing
the English public: Poetry, PJjetoric and Politics, 1627-1660 (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1999); Nigel Smith, Literature and devolution in England, 1640-1660 (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1994); James Holstun, ed.. Pamphlet Wars: Prose in the English devolution,
(London: Frank Cass, 1992); Thomas N. Corns, Unchistered Virtue: English PotiticalLiterature,
1640-1660 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992); and David Loewenstein, depresenting
devolution in MUton and His Contemporaries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
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state. In the political discourse of the period, the rhetorical struggle
between the two sides becomes a matter of determining which
part—the King or Parliament—most fully represents the whole nation
and thus has greater political legitimacy, and which, conversely, is
merely a part. For some Parliamentary writers, this struggle becomes, at
first, a matter of asserting the more encompassing representative
authority of that part constituted by the two houses of Parliament, then
by the House of Commons alone, while for Royalists, the idea of any
such fragmented representation is, through the logic of the body politic,
illegitimate.
Synecdoche, to be sure, is a basic feature of political discourse. In
A. Grammar of Motives, the rhetorical theorist Kenneth Burke observed
that synecdoche appears "in aU theories of political representation,
where some part of the social body...is held to be representative of the
society as a whole." Burke goes on to say that, "though there are many
disagreements within a society as to what part should represent the
whole and how this representation should be accomplished, in a
complex civilization any act of representation automatically implies a
synecdochic relationship."^ Only a small percentage of citizens meet in
a legislative body or hold executive offices, but, even so, they generally
purport to speak for their entice nation. Thus, political representation
finds its rhetorical analogue in synecdoche.
Seventeenth-century theorists thought about representation in
terms of metaphor as well as synecdoche, however. Specifically, in the
1640s, victuaUy everyone agreed on the legitimacy of the metaphor of
the body politic, although this agreement would disappear during the
next two decades. "Body politic" is a figure of speech perhaps most
familiar to modern readers through Thomas Hobbes's Geviathan, which
characterizes the state as an "ArtificiaU Man," a principle vividly
illustrated in Abraham Bosse's title page engraving of a regal figure
whose body is constimted by the aggregation of all the individual
citizens of the state.^ Hobbes, however, radically transformed the
traditional notion by making the body politic more a machine than an
animated being, and his theories were aU the more striking because he

^ Kenneth Burke,^ Grammar of Motives (Mew Yoik; Prentice-Hall, 1952), 508.
'Thomas Hobbes, Ijviathan: Or the Matter, Formeand Power of a Common Wealth,Ecclesiasticall and
Civil (London, 1651), 1. Hobbes gives an extended treatment of the metaphor in T)e Corpore
Politico (London, 1652).
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had manipulated a metaphor that was one of the most widely used topoi
in medieval and early modern political discourse.'^ Traditional uses of
the image, on the other hand, had rested on the specific analogical
habits that characterized the cosmological, scientific, and political
thought of the Middle Ages and early Renaissance (and I say "specific
habits" because all systems of thought, including modern science, adopt
analogies with more or less self-awareness).^ Scholars of the literature of
these periods are sufficientiy familiar with literary and philosophical
descriptions of corresponding structures at the levels of microcosm,
macrocosm, and body politic to render detailed documentation of their
existence unnecessary. Instead this essay attempts to show the extent to
which one set of correspondences became a focus of political contro
versy.
Before Hobbes, the Elizabethan and J acobean politician Sir Edwin
Sandys had clearly explained the rationale of the "representative body"
when he wrote that "the whole do join in making laws to govern the
whole; for it is fit and just, that every man do join in making that which
shall bind and govern him, and because every man cannot be personally
present, therefore a representative body is made to perform that
service.'"' Before Sandys, Henry VIII had provided a clear description
of the anatomy of the political body when he explained to one of his
Parliaments that he, "as head, and you as members, are conjoined and
knit together into one body politic."^ But there was never universal
agreement about the precise application of the analogy of body and
state, and disputes about its significance would become increasingly
pointed during the tumults of the 1640s. The representation of the
political body in the pamphlet wars of this and the ensuing decade came
to exemplify the way in which, as Lois Potter has put it, "the struggle

* The fullest analysis of the concept is David George Hale, The Body Politic: PoHlicalMetaphor
in Binaissance English Literature (The Hague: Mouton, 1971). Hale discusses some applications
of the metaphor during the Civil Wars and Interregnum, but does not assess the issue of the
fragmented body in terms of political representation (108—30). Seealso Emst H. Kantorowicz,
The King'sTwo Bodies:A Study inMedkvalPoBticalTheologj (Princeton:Princeton UniversityPress,
1957). On Hobbes's transformation of the motif, see I. Bernard Cohen, "Harrington and
Harvey: A Theory of the State Based on the New Physiology,"/wrwa/ the Histoiy of Ideas55
(1994), 197.
' For a discussion of analogical thinking, seeJoseph A. Mazzeo, "Universal Analogy and the
Culture of the Renaissance,"A Histoy of Ideas 15 (1954): 299—304.
® Quoted in David L. Smith, The Stuart Parliaments, 1603-1689 (London: Arnold, 1999), 7.
' Quoted in Smith, The Stuart Parliaments, 31.
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between royalist and parliamentary writers was a struggle for the
possession of certain powerful images."®
Before the Civil Wars, the EngUsh Parliament was conceptualized
as a threefold entity consisting of Crown, Lords, and Commons
working together as "the body politic," with the king as head and the
houses as the trunk.' (While such a formulation implies that the king is
part of Parliament, the term "Parliament" is more frequently used to
refer to the houses.) Although Parliament originated as a royal council
called by the king, it had, over time, accmed judicial and legislative
responsibilities, and, as these responsibilities grew, the role of Parlia
ment as a representative body became ever more firmly established.'®
Because of the conciliar origins of the Houses and the king's power to
summon and dissolve them, the king was typically figured as the head
and the Houses as the trunk and limbs, with a clear hierarchical
implication.
The body metaphor implies not only hierarchy, however, but also
unity, and so commentators often used it to stress the indissolubility of
the King-Lords-Commons triad. To be sure, in the day-to-day workings
of Parliament, cooperation between the houses and the crown was the
norm, although disagreements and friction might stand out in modern
treatments of parliamentary history. As Conrad Russell has shown, any
disagreement between the crown and the houses "was regarded as a
cause of shame and disgrace."" The paradigm of the body politic
intensified the scandal of any such dissension, for if body and head are
not working together, the cause must lie in disease or madness.
Nevertheless, the system could create tensions,especially under the early

® Potter, Secret'Rites and Secret "Writing: "Royalist Uterature, 1641-1660 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1989), 179.
' Cohen notes that a few commentators analogized the king and the heart, but this was rare
(191—92). For a contrasting notion, based upon the theories of Bodin, of an absolute ruler as
having, by virtue of his sovereignty, a position outside the body politic, see Jacques Maritain,
"The
American "PoliticalScience "Review dA (1950), 343-57, esp. 348-49.
On the development of Parliament's various roles as they relate to seventeenth-century
politics, see Smith, The Stuart Parliaments, 3-10, 32-48, and Michael Mendle, "The Great
Council of Parliamentand the First Ordinances:The Constitutional Theory of the Civil War,"
Journal of British Studies SX (1992): 133-62, esp. 135—36.
" Conrad Russell, Parliament and EngUsh Politics, 1621-1629 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979),
5. On the symbolic importance of Parliament as an image of unity between the king and the
realm, see Russell, Parliament and English PoUtics, 54. For a description of working relations
between the Houses and the Crown, see Smith, The Stuart Parliaments, 87-98.
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Stuarts, who often expressed impatience with Parliament. King James
I once called the House of Commons a "body without a head," thus
implying its unfocused irrationality, but on the whole he worked well
with his Parliaments, at least better than his heir Charles I, who tried to
mle without them and was ultimately executed by one.'^ Neither the
system nor the metaphor necessarily functioned with perfect smooth
ness.
Still, the organic model of the state achieved wide acceptance, even
if there could be disagreement on its exact namre and structure. What
exactly was Parliament representing, and what was the manner of such
representation? How, precisely, did the King, Lords, and Commons fit
into a representational scheme? And what exactly was the relative
weight of the power of the crown and that of the houses? In answer to
the first question, historian David L. Smith notes that members of
Parliament did not represent "constiments in any direct numerical
sense"; they represented "communities," and often did not live in the
communities that they represented.^^ Some early modern theorists
attempted to use estates theory to make the King, Lords, and Commons
represent the different social classes, but the mingling of Lords Spirimal
and Lords Temporal in the upper house, along with the unusual
identification of the crown as an estate by these theorists, made this a
difficult proposition to maintain." Others argued that Parliament
represented die interest of the kingdom, but in the 1640s, the definition
of that interest varied widely, with Royalists often linking it to questions
of public safety and Parliamentarians to the economic concerns of
subjects.'® As for the relative power of the crown and the houses, the
king might often be characterized as singulis major, universis minor
than individuals, lesser than the whole"), but given his powers to
summon, prorogue, dissolve, and suspend Parliaments, he could often
seem superior to the rest." But in 1641, the uprising in Ireland
provoked Parliament to claim the right to raise an army—thitherto a
royal prerogative—and the resulting political crisis gave rise to argu-

Smith, The Stuart Parliaments, 103.
" Smith, The Stuart Parliaments, 22.
" Smith, The Stuart Parliaments, 82-83.
" On evolving and competing definitions of interest in this period, seeJ. A. W. Gunn, Politics
and the Public Interest in the Seventeenth Centuiy (London: Roudedge and Kegan Paul; Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1969).
" Smith, The Stuart Parliaments,97—98.
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ments about the relative authority of the king and the houses. In the
words of Kevin Sharpe, the events of the 1640s made it possible to
conceive "an alternative parliamentary government." Accordingly, it
became necessary to "rewrite the language of politics."'^ "Body politic"
was a cmcial idiom in that language that would be subjected to critical
examination.
In a 1648 pamphlet, Charles DaUison offers a RoyaUst recounting
of the nature and origins of the English mixed monarchy in terms of
representative body of the nation: "[TJhe parliament became a body
composed thus,
of the Lords Spirimall, the Lords Temporall, and
the Commons being three Estates, and the King head of aU, and as the
soul adding life."'^ Despite his use of estates theory, which ordinarily
holds that each house represents a specific segment of the populace,
Dallison denies that either house—or the kingfor that matter—"can be
said to represent only any part; every common person doth herein.. .as
much depend upon the judgement of the King and the Lords, as upon
the Members of the Commons House. And so do the King and Lords
upon those Members" (32). For Dallison, the King is as integral to
Parliament as the houses are, if not more so: as the "soul," he is its
animating force, one might say its essence, and without him, no
Parliament can exist. Dallison's argument emphasizes organic connec
tions between the institutions so as to invalidate any claims to greater
representational legitimacy in one or the other of them, and we can see
that Dallison is especially concerned about Commons' claims in this
regard.
Dallison's argument illustrates the utility of the body metaphor for
the Royalists. If the king is the head or the soul, he must be obeyed and
must not come to harm. John Cleveland's Xi2iCt Majestaslntemeratam^kes
the implication of this Royalist position even more explicit than does
Dallison. Like DaUison, Cleveland regards the poUtical body as
consisting of the king in Parliament, the king being "the head, the Lords
the principal, and the Knights, Citizens and Burgesses, the inferiour

" Kevin Shaipe, Politics and Ideas in B.arly Stuart 'England: Essays and Studies (London: Pinter,
1989), 65.
[Charles Dallison], The Royalists D^ence:Vindicating the Kings Proceedingsin the Eate Warre against
Him ([London], 1648), 9. See Hobbes, who calls the sovereign power "an Artificial Soul, as
giving life and motion to the whole body" (1); Hobbes does not specify that the sovereign
power must be a monarch, however.
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members."^' Cleveland predictably argues that "the rest of the Body
ever obeyed the summons of the Head.. .all jurisdiction being in him"
(53), and that it is illogical to eliminate the office of the monarch, for
"no body can have such a law or custom to destroy it self, to cut off its
own head" (38). Parliamentary proceedings against the King must be
seen as a fundamental violation of the constitution, just as suicide might
be imagined as a violation of natural law.
The body metaphor would thus seem to favor a Royalist posi
tion—^unsurprising, since it was developed to describe a monarchical
government. One possible rhetorical counter-move to a Royalist body
politic argument was to reject it outright, as did John HaU in his 1651
treatise The Grounds and Reasons of Monarchy Considered. HaU perceptively
observed that the analogy of king to the head, with the implication that
the people are "no more then a trunk, [is] onely Metaphorical!, and
proves nothing."^" John Milton would also reject the trope in his
regicide pamphlets.^^ Even so, it is a testimony to the power of the
metaphor that many Revolutionaries sought to appropriate it for their
own ends and to work around the problems posed by the king's
traditional position in it. Cleveland's argument about the impossibiUty
of the body's cutting off the head, for example, would be countered by
the assertion that every member of a body has a natural right to act for
the benefit of the whole, and that the needs of the greater part of the
body should outweigh the claims of the higher part. In Vox Pacijica
(1645), George Wither elaborately explained the difference between the
body politic and the body natural:
The life of Bodies-naturall, indeed.
Departs out of them, when their head is gone;
And, thereunto, no other can succeed.
To make it live, or not a headlesse-one.
So 'tis not in this Bodie-politike.
The vitalls of it in the body lie.
Not in that head-ship: and, though it be sick
When that faUs from it, yet, it doth not die.
A Ting, is but a substituted-head.

' Majestas Intmerata: Or, The Immortality of the King ([London], 1649), 47.
° The Grounds and Reasons ofMonarcfy Considered, corrected ed., ([London?], 1651), 40.
' See Hale, The Body Tolitic, 123.
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Made for conveniende-. And, if thereby
The bodie seem to be indangered,
(If Power it hath) it hsPrxA-uthoritie
To take one off, and set another on;
AsweU, as, at the first, to make it one.^^

For Wither, the king is not the animating force, as he had been in
Dailison's analysis, but merely an instrument of a body that possesses
in itself the "vitalls," or the life-giving power.
like Wither, John Goodwin argues from the interest of the greater
part in Right and Might Well Met, a tract justifying Parliament's taking up
arms against the crown. Parliament came to oppose the king by "the
generaU call of the major part of the people, by which they were inabled
to act in a Parliamentary capacity.This call is "generall" because it
involves the safety of the kingdom as a whole, and because the
possession of a majority (the "major part") implies the right to represent
the totality. The argument that, because Parliament had many members,
it more fully represented the complex interests of the realm than did the
crown—^the possession of only one man—^is fairly commonplace.^"^ But
majority is not the essential point for Goodwin; rather, the interests of
the body can sometimes best be served by a numerically unrepresenta
tive agent. Even if no Parliament were in session, says Goodwin, "any
one man" could justly resist the power of the king if it threatened "the
Peace, Liberties and safety of the Kingdome" (5). The paradigm of the
body politic provides the rationale for this claim: "every member, as
well in a body politique, as naturall, hath a sufficient call, yea, an
ingagement lying by way of duty upon it, to act at any time, and in aU
cases, according to its best and utmost capacity, or ability, for the
preservation and benefit of the whole" (5). If other parts of the
representative body can no longer be seen as representing the interests
of the nation as a whole, then a mere part of that body may become the
more legitimate representative.
Goodwin frequently links governmental legitimacy to the interests
of the greater part of the nation, as is seen in his justification of Pride's

^ George Wither, Vox Padfica (London, 1645), 138.
John Goodwin, Right and Might Well Met (London, 1648), 4.
Gunn, Politics and the Public Interest, 7. It should be noted that the interests so defended were
those of the property-owning classes only.
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Purge, the notorious expulsion from the House of Commons on 6
December 1648 of those members who favored negotiations with the
king. The more radical members (often called Independents, a name
that historians have shown to be imprecise),^^ to whom the purge gave
control of Commons, considered such negotiations pointless. The
army's actions were justified, says Goodwin, because they served to
protect the whole kingdom rather than the "liberties or priviledges onely
of a part of it; especially of such a part, which, for numbers, is inconsid
erable" (31). For Goodwin, the monarchy must bow to the greater
representative significance of the House of Commons. The paradigm of
a body politic with the king as head seems close to being jettisoned, as
would happen in Hall's treatise several years later, but Goodwin does
not go that far. Yet he does argue that no governmental institution can
be said to possess any mystical protection owing to the metaphor of the
body, and this includes not only the relationships between the Crown,
Lords, and Commons, but also the status of members in the Houses of
Parliament. These are connected issues, of course, because the purge
prepared the way for the trial and execution of the king, as well as for
the abolition of the monarchy and the House of Lords. Goodwin's
arguments inevitably require a refiguration of the state, a necessity that
the author confronts in a bit of rhetorical theorizing:
[Tjhat which gives a kinde of sacred inviolablenesse unto the
rights and priviledges ofParliament, is that typicall relation which
they beare to the rights, priviledges, and liberties, of the Kingdome, and Common-wealth. Now types are alwayes inferiour
to the things imported, and represented by them;...and when
they occasion, or threaten any damage, to their anti-tipes, they
may or ought to suffer a defacement. (31)
As long as it contained those members who favored negotiations with
the king, the representative body of Parliament—the "type," that is, the
figure of speech—posed a danger to its real, non-rhetorical referent, or

^ On the problem of identifjdng and naming parliamentary factionsin the late 1640s and early
1650s, see David Underdown, Pride's Purge: Politics in the Puritan Revolution (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1971), 1—4, 45-105, and Blair Worden, The Rump Parliament, 1648-1653 (Cambridge;
Cambridge University Press, 1974), 4—11.
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"anti-tipe," the commonwealth. Thus, action must he taken: "deface
ment," another corporeal metaphor.
When Goodwin and other radical parliamentarians reacted against
what they saw as the King's desire to exercise unrestrained control over
the kingdom, they characterized his actions as an inordinate inflation of
the privileges of one minor part of the body politic.^*^ A declaration
issued under the name of Sir Thomas Fairfax and dated "9 January
1647" (1648 n.s.) refers to "the indeavours to swallow up the whole
interest of the Kingdom, into the power and wiU of the King." Less
than a week before, on 3 January, the purged Commons had voted to
prohibit further negotiations with Charles. The Fairfax proclamation
asserts that Commons intends to carry out everything to which it had
committed itself in that vote "for setling and securing the Parliament,
and Kingdom without the King, and against him, or any other that shall
hereafter partake with him."^^ The contrast with Dallison is stark. The
diction of the proclamation contrasts Parliament and the kingdom on
the one side with the king's status as an individual. While it is possible
that the proclamation refers to Charles personally rather than to the
office of the king, the language here is at least verging on the republican
proposition that the monarch is no longer an essential part of the
representative body.
In January 1649, Parliament, greatly reduced in numbers by Pride's
Purge, desertions, and other causes of attrition, emphatically attempted
a settling of the kingdom without the king by decapitating Charles I.
Commons eliminated the office of king altogether that February and, in
March, excised another piece of the Parliamentary triad when it
abolished the House of Lords. The logic of a kingless kingdom seen in
the Fairfax proclamation was thus enacted politically and, unsurprising
ly, reiterated rhetorically.John Canne, for instance, justified Commons'
actions by stating, "The King is but a part or member of the King
dom"—and thus not the soul, as he was for the Royalist Dallison. In
contrast, "the Commons in the house of Parliament" is "the representative
KingdomP^ The king has been reduced to the status of a mere part, but

^ See Gunn, Politics and the Public Interest,1.
^ Thomas May, A Breviary of the Historf of the Parliament of England (London, 1650), 183.
John Canne, The Golden Rule, Or, Justice Advanced. Wherein is showed. That the Representative
Kingdom, or Commons assembled in Parliament, have a lanfullpower to arraign, and a^udge to death the
King (London, 1649), 25, 32.
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Commons has become a functionally complete representative body,
even if the commonwealth is still called a kingdom. Moreover, Canne
implicitly places the king outside the body politic when he figures him as
"a minister, or steward, or servant of the people," with Commons
"representing the whole body of the people" (32). Canne's language
reflects the terms of the revolutionary settlement, for Commons had
decreed on 4January 1649 that, as an elected assembly, it held supreme
authority, and "that whatever is enacted, or declared for law, by the
Commons...hath the force of law; and all the people are concluded
thereby, although the consent and concurrence of the king, or House of
Lords, be not had thereunto."^' From such a legal principle, it follows
that the king should be elided from the representational apparatus of the
body politic, as indeed he is in a statement made byJohn Bradshaw on
27 January as he sentenced Charles to death; "For the body of the
people of England hath been—and where else—represented but in the
Parliament, and could you but have confounded that, you had at one
blow cut off the neck of England."^" In the traditional discourse of the
body politic, a blow to the neck of England would have implied an
attempt against the life the king, but the imagery clearly functions
otherwise here. Commons had (to use Burke's phrasing) declared itself
to be that "part of the social body" that is "representative of the society
as a whole"; in such a figurative scheme, there is no place for the trope
of king-as-head.
Since the early days of the war, Royalists had disputed the
legitimacy of the Long Parliament because, even before Colonel Pride's
intervention, it had already purged off many members who did not
support the Revolution. While a Parliamentary apologist such as
Goodwin might justify these actions as a necessary "defacement,"
Royalists argued that since so many of the members or limbs of
Parliament had been amputated, so to speak, it could not function as a
representative body.^' (This leaves aside the question of whether

® Quoted in Smith, The Stuart Parliaments, 47.
^ The Trial of Charles I: A Documentaiy Histo^, ed. David Lagomarsino and Charles T. Wood
(Hanover: University Press of New England, 1989), 122.
See, for example, the broadside HisMajesties Psasons Against the Pretendedlurisdiction of the High
Court of lustice (n.p., 1648/49), which argues that the "major part" of Commons "are detain'd
or deter'd from sitting," and that the "consent at least of the major part of every man in
England" is required for the Parliamentary court to have authority. See also the anonymous
tract The PjojaUsts Defence (n.p., 1648), 113ff.
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Parliament had ever been truly representative, given the privileged status
of the members, the existence of pocket boroughs, and an electorate
restricted by sex and social class.)^^ After Pride's Purge, which left
Commons with about 210 of its original 507 members (and an average
attendance of only 50 to 60), opponents of the Revolution deployed the
term "Rump" Parliament as a means of denying the representative
legitimacy of the assembly.^^
First employed by Clement Walker in 1649, the name "Rump"
became especially popular when the surviving members of the purged
Long Parliament were re-summoned in 1659 in the series of events
leading up to the restoration of the monarchy.^"* References to the
"Rump" virtually define the Royalist popular literature of the late 1650s
and early 1660s; one polemicist's alternative anatomical figuration of the
purged Parliament as "this little Toe" did not catch on.^® The rhetorical
appeal of the term can be seen in the numerous editions of the verse
anthology Rump, or, y^n Exact Collection of the Chqycest Poems and Songs
Relating to the Eate Times, often attributed to the editorship of Alexander
Brome.^® As an anatomical metaphor, "Rump" implies that only an
embarrassingly small part of Parliamentary body remains intact, and that
that part represents its cloacal impulses and lower nature. It could be
further used to dehumanize the body, since rump designates a cut of
meat, and, on the eve of the Restoration, people roasted rumps of beef
in the street as a political statement.^^ In a recent article, Mark S. R.
Jenner seems to have been the first scholar to discuss this term in the
context of the body politic—a somewhat surprising fact since the

Smith, Tie Stuart ParSammts, 27.
The numbers come from Smith, The Stuart Parliaments, 22—23,136.
Worden, The Pump Parliament, 4; OED "rump" sb. 3b. The same entry in OED quotes the
epistle to the reader in Rump Songs, which attributes the first use of the epithet to "an honest
Sheet of Paper (call'd The Bloody Rump) written before the Tryal of our late Soveraign of
Glorious Memory," but this work has apparendy not survived.
That Wicked and Blasphemous Petition of Praise-god Barbone, and his Sectarian Crew (n.p., 1660), 6.
The author develops the anatomical analogy by contrasting the "litde Toe" with "the other
mote noble and serviceable Members of the body" (6).
^ Rump, or, An Exact Collection of the Choicest Poems and Songs Relating to the hate Times. The
attribution to Brome, commonplace in bibliographies and catalogues, has been disputed by a
modern editor (Alexander Brome, Poems, ed. Roman R. Dubinski [Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1982], 1:38-39.
The Diary of John Evelyn,ed. William Bray, 2 vols. (London: Dent, 1966), 1:340.
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connection clearly exists in the rhetoric of the period.^® A brief glance
at a poem attributed to Thomas Jordan will suffice to demonstrate how
"Rump" relates to "body politic":
Lo here a Glorious Realm subverted stands.
Just Tumbler-Rke. upon the Feet and Hands;
Once Europes Pride and Emy, now their Scoff,
Since the base Entrajles cut the Head on't off.
The Body lost its form, and's turned a Eump;
Now all the Eimhs are Vassals to the Rump,
Which all the Nutriture devour'd and spent,
Yileds nothing back but stink and excrement.
The poem continues by describing the progress of the disease of
revolution in the "pining Bodff and concludes that the state can be
saved only if all the members yield to the head, a common argument in
Royalist uses of the body trope.'*" A body politic that has degenerated
into a mere Rump cannot subsist: lacking the direction of the head and
the means of securing "Nutriture," it can only generate pollution and
filth, with ultimately fatal results. Similar scatological observations about
the revolutionaries' place in the body politic were made in dozens of
poems in the Ratmp anthology.'**
If "Rump" was a way of characterizing the Revolutionaries as "the
Humours left behind after the substance of the Body politick is purg'd
away by the devils potions,'"*^ then mocking the Nominated Assembly
that met betweenJuly and December 1653 as "Barebone's Parliament"
would seem to have offered another ready and easy way to manipulate

" Mark S. R. Jenner, "The Roasting of the Rump: Scatology and the Body PoKtic in
Restoration England," Past and Present 111 (2002); 84-120.
^ ThomasJordan, "The New State Described," Poet^ and Pivolution: An Anthologj/ of British and
Irish Verse, 1625—1660, ed. Peter Davidson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 1-8.
^ For a discussion of such arguments, see Elizabeth Skerpan, The PJietoric of Politics in the English
Bevolution, 1642—1660 (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1992), 172-74.
Some selections homBump, or. An Exact Collection of the Chycest Poems and Songs PLclating to the
hate Times (London, 1662) that emphasize the Rump's relationship to the body politic include
another piece by Jordan titled "A Tetany for the New-year," (pt. 2, pp. 94—95), as well as "A
City Ballad" (pt. 2, p. 33), "A Christmas Song, when the RUMP was Erst dissolved) (pt. 2, pp.
52-54, esp. p. 53), and the picturesquely titled "Bum-fodder: or, Waste-Paper,Proper to Wipe
the Nations RUMP with, or Your Own," (pt. 2, pp. 54—57, esp. pp. 55 and 56).
The Character of the Bump (London, 1660), 1.
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the image of the body politic. The history and application of this label
are somewhat complex, however. Its derivation from the surname of
one of its members, Praisegod Barbon, or Barebone, is weU known.
Less clear are the matters of who first applied his name to that
Parliament and when this occurred. In what Austin Woolrych describes
as "surely the earliest instance of the familiar nickname," George
Thomason wrote upon a manuscript roster of this assembly, "These are
the members of Barebones Parliament, as they were pleased to call
themselves.'"^^ Woolrych dates this inscription as contemporarywith the
assembly itself, thus suggesting that the name was not applied only in
retrospect, as some historians maintain, but the dating remains
conjectural.''^ (Woolrych plausibly suggests that the latter half of
Thomason's sentence refers not to the entire phrase "Barebones Parlia
ment" but only to its denomination as a "Parliament," a title that the
assembly granted itself even though it had been appointed, not elected;
that is, they didn't call themselves "Barebones Parliament," just a
"Parliament.")
Because its namesake was not actually a prominent member of the
assembly, the title "Barebone's Parliament" was clearly meant to exploit
the oddity of the name Praisegod Barebon itself. His name has always
evoked laughter, as demonstrated by the old canard about his having
two brothers, Christ-came-into-the-world-to-save Barebone and IfChrist-had-not-died-thou-hadst-been-damned Barebone, commonly
called Damned Barebone. These ersatz given names mock that of
Barebone himself, and, more generally, the Puritanism that it reflects,
for hortatory names such as his had long been a target of anti-Puritan
satire.''^ His surname, on the other hand, when attached to "Parliament,"
suggests a defective body politic comprising members that the Earl of
Clarendon disdainfully characterized as "A pack of weak, senseless
fellows," most of whom were "inferior persons, of no quality or name.
"The Calling of Barebone's Parliament," Eng/ish Historical 'Review 80 (1965); 508.
^ Austin Woolrych, Commonwealth to 'Protectorate (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), 166.
Barbon's biographer defends the possible veracity of these supposed names Qane Lane,
Puritan, Rake, and Squire [London: Evans Brothers, 1950), 8, but they are certainly a joke.
Despite the fact that only a small fraction of Puritans actually received so-called hortatory
names, Ben Jonson exemplifies the common perception when he makes one character in
Bartholomew Fair
that all Puritans "have such names" as Zeal-of-the-Land and Win-thefight (BartholomewFair, ed. Edward B. Partridge [Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1964],
1.3.126); on Puritan names, see Scott Smith-Bannister, Names and Naming Patterns in England,
1538-1700 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 3-5.
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artificers of the meanest trades, known only by their gifts in praying and
preaching.'""' Although the term is properly rendered in modem
orthography as "Barebone's Parliament"—a possessive rather than an
adjectival form—the potential for anatomical jokes remains. This is
especially tme in Early Modern English, which typically omits the
apostrophe and so makes the term look as much like an adjective as a
possessive. A couple of satirical broadsides published in 1660 illustrate
the way the name lent itself to the discourse of the body politic. Thomas
Jordan, once again, praises General Monck (who had recalled the Rump
for the purposes of restoring the monarchy) by observing that "Those
ravenous Beasts that our destmction wrought / When Church and State
were to the Barebone brought / (Pr^se God) you ransom'd.'"^^ The body
of the state,Jordan suggests, had been devoured by the Revolutionaries,
who left only the skeleton behind. An anonymous broadside of the
same year also toys with Barebone's name while musing that the
reinstated Rump might destroy itself unless its power is circumscribed:
"if you prevent them not by paring their nayles, they wiU scratch their
Arse to the Bare hones."^^ Yet references to Barebone's Parliament are
somewhat rare in the period, and these are the only examples I could
find that explicitly play on the concept of the body politic. Doubtless
the greater political importance of the Rump—^its lengthy duration, its
role in the regicide, and its resurrection in 1659—made it a more
compelling subject.
The dismissal of the Rump in 1659 and the reintegration KingLords-Commons triad in 1660 would have seemed to call for numerous
joyful descriptions of a reconstituted body politic, but this was not in
fact the case as authors tended to focus on other topics of praise. A
notable use of the image, however, appears in George Wither's 1660
verse tract called Speculum Speculatimm, which, Hke his earlier, proParliament Vox Padfica, developed the trope of a political body that
does not operate by the same laws as the body natural. This time.
Wither uses the argument to celebrate the Restoration. His very long

^ Quoted in Austin Woolrych, 'Britain in 'Revolution, 1625—1660 (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2002), 540.
''^'thom2s]oxdaa,A.SpeechSpokentoHisExcellengThel^dGeneralMonck.AtSkinnersHallOn
Wednesday, being the 4"". of April,
(London, [1660]).
The Petition of the 'Rump to the Honourable CiP) ofhondon (broadside, n.p., n.d.).
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poem calls for unity under the King in the aftermath of civil war, and,
at one point, adopts conventional body politic imagery, asking
how can possibly that Bo^ be
From great Distempers, or Destruction free.
Whose Head and Members are from one another
Divided? or so cruel to each other
As not to let each part, enjoy that dole
Which Mature gave them to preserve the wholer^'
Yet, when examining the causes of the Regicide, he looks back to 1649
with a mixture of approval and regret. He explains that it is sometimes
necessary to perform political surgery to remove gangrenous limbs in
order "To save the Whole" (16). The Regicide, he suggests, was an
extraordinary instance of such a medical intervention, for "once, when
sick to death the Body lay / Twas cured by taking of the Head away"
(17)—a bold use of an argument that, according to Cleveland and other
Royalists, self-evidently violated the laws of nature. The nation only
survived, however, because of a miracle performed by a deity who can
violate those laws at wiU:
GOD, who of evil things can make good uses.
And, by what is unwholesome. Health produces,
Vouchsafeth to make passage now and then.
To signal Blessings, by the sins of men[.] (17)
Wither thus represents the Regicide much as the Crucifixion is
understood in Christian theology; an event performed by men acting
upon wicked motives but providentially leading to salvation.
Wither's argument represents a compromise between Parliamentar
ian and Royalist positions, a fitting use of the body politic analogy
insofar as the purpose of that trope is to assert unity. In an important
way, however, the septuagenarian Wither's language represents the
discourse of a bygone era, for the image of the body politic began to
lose its force in serious political discussions at approximately this time.
Although, in the words of David G. Hale, "the analogy between

' George Wither, Speculum Speculativum (London, [1660]), 5.
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organism and society did not suddenly disappear,"its appearances were
to become "brief, unoriginal, and void of any implications rising from
the analogy." As Hale argues, the "general acceptance of Lockean
politics and Newtonian physics" undoubtedly discouraged thinkers from
taking the idea too seriously.^" Some of the references cited in this essay,
however, suggest that the credibility of arguments based on the idea of
a body politic was already waning by the 1650s, well before the
publication of any works by Newton or Locke themselves. Yet the
Enlightenment mentality that these authors represent was already in
development during the middle decades of the seventeenth century, and
it was just one of the important cultural changes that may have
discouraged the discourse of the body politic. Joseph A. Ma2zeo has
suggested, for instance, that Cartesianism and Baconianism destroyed
the analogical thinking of the Middle Ages and Renaissance.^' In
addition, Michael Walzer has demonstrated that the organic analogy,
which depended on an intuitive or affective acceptance by the commu
nity rather than on strict logical demonstration, ceased having an
emotive effect as Copernican cosmology and Protestant individualism
created a new frame of reference that, over time, came to be seen as
incompatible with the analogical and universalizing tendencies of
medieval political thought. With these changes in mind, it is perhaps
fitting that the last great rhetorical treatment of the organic analogy in
England may have been the satires on the Rump, as though the very
idea of the body politic had been reduced to a fraction of its former
significance.

^ Hale, Tie Bo^ PoHHc, 131.
" Mazzeo, "Universal Analogy and the Culture of the Renaissance," 304.

